Railways.

Although electric services operated over a few routes, and trials with diesel powered trains had began in a small way even before WWll, not only were the overwhelming majority of services still operated by steam locomotives but even in the mid 1950's new steam locomotives were still being designed and built. Almost all the modernisation plans that the private railway companies had been contemplating before the war were dropped.

Admittedly there were some sound reasons for continuing with steam traction, including that it was a well tried, proven technology, the infrastructure to support it was in place & fully operational and that it used British sourced coal (ie: not imported oil). However steam traction was (and is) both dirty and very labour intensive. Plus, in an era when environmental issues were just beginning to come into the public consciousness the pollution caused by steam engines was becoming seen to be part of the problem, especially in urban areas. The pea-souper smogs of the 1950's eventually lead to the introduction of Clean Air which resulted in a significant reduction in urban coal-sourced pollution, although a generation later oil sourced air pollution had become - in its own way - equally life-harming... and this still remains to be tackled.

Before almost every journey a steam locomotive requires to be coaled & watered, the fire must be started and built up to create the steam that provides the motive force, two crew are needed to operate it (driver and fireman), at the end of the day's journey(s) the engine needs cleaning out, the clinker, ash etc removing from the fire box, plus many other tasks which can take much time both before and after journeys - - all these being tasks which might create much employment but in an era of rapidly rising pay rates also served to increase operating costs significantly.

It was as late as 1955 that a modernisation plan was finally launched which, amongst other things was going to see wholesale replacement of steam engines with diesels and, for a mere handful of routes, electrics. However by now it was too late - post-war fuel and raw material rationing was ending and road transport really taking off - so by leaving it so late to modernise the railways had virtually thrown away any advantage they had had in land transport. Worse still, partly because the modernisation had been provoked by spiralling financial losses into "doing something" "in a hurry" poor planning, a lack of overall vision of how to modernise plus insufficient fiscal controls and even - in some cases - the 'wrong' type of investment pushed up costs without always achieving the required (expected, hoped-for) results.

Named Evening Star the last mainline steam locomotive to be built by British Railways was constructed in 1960. It had a very short career, being withdrawn from regular use in 1965, which in a way was crazy as steam locomotives typically had working lives of at least 50 years - if not much longer. Although withdrawn Evening Star has been preserved and is sometimes steamed at railway preservationist living museums.

On the mainline railway the mainstream use of steam locomotives ended in 1968, although they continue to be used on a handful of leisure based passenger trains for nostalgic reasons.

Epilogue

When looking back it is easy to take the view that the railways had become like an almost fossilised lumbering giant, or stuck in a time warp, and they was doing things because thats how things had always been done - even though technology was changing and there were more advanced ways of doing things.

However it seems that the railway decision makers had been taking longer term strategic views and were planning modernisation to be a slower, more controlled process. For the mainlines it was felt to be better to electrify immediately - even if it had meant that the use of steam locomotives would have lasted a little longer. The decision makers wanted to avoid dieselising first and then electrifying later, because whilst this would have been cheaper in the short term the subsequent 20 - 30 year delay whilst the diesel equipment became life expired would effectively result in the task, and expense, being passed to the next generation. In addition, it was recognised that instead of using imported oil (which would negatively impact upon the nation's balance of payments) electric trains used electricity that was generated from home produced coal - something that helped create work for British coal miners.

Instead however there was the hurried dieselisation, leaving a legacy whereby some mainline routes which it was expected would have been electrified still remained diesel powered 60 years later. (eg: Midland Main Line between London St Pancras & Yorkshire and the Great Western Main Line between London & South Wales / South West England.)

The 1960's - the axe man cometh.

By 1961 the loss of traffic - and financial deficits - had become so serious that the civil servants (under the direction of a Government Transport Minister who owned a road-building company) appointed a new Chairman to the newly formed British Railways Board who was specifically given the task of making the railways pay. To do this a survey was undertaken of the British railway network designed to find out which parts were profitable and where the losses were being made. In 1963 a report was published (called "The Reshaping of British Railways") which for the first time gave an accurate description of the state of the network.

It had been suspected a lot of the rail network was under used and therefore uneconomic, and the report confirmed this, revealing that only half the routes covered the cost of operating them, and that half the stations appeared to produce about 95% of all the revenue.

Following this, in 1965 a plan was finalised which recommended only about half of the 17,000 miles of track be retained - with about 3,000 miles of the remnant being considerably upgraded.

In the eyes of many people, had they fully enacted, what was being proposed would have considerably reduced the scope and effectiveness of the railways to a point whereby they would have been (almost) completely killed off. Indeed, had these short-sighted plans come to fruition then apart from a handful of high profile lines the railways would have been reduced to little more than urban transport providers serving a few major cities only. Crazy as it now seems, the intention was even for busy trunk routes such as the London - Edinburgh ECML (East Coast Main Line) to terminate at Newcastle-Upon-Tyne - as the end of a single track freight branch!

The closures actually began before the report had even been published - often against very bitter local opposition - and in 1964, seeing the railway's popularity with the general public, the Labour Party (led by Harold Wilson) included in their general election campaign manifesto a promise to halt them. However, within a week of taking office his administration reviewed the issue and instead accelerated the closure program. It is very much a matter for dismay but such two-faced behaviour is typical for politicians.

It could even be said that the closures were forced upon an opposing population in spite of / with contempt for their needs and wishes. Many, many former rail users had no desire to learn to drive and buy a car but not seeing the replacement buses (where provided) as offering a viable alternative the railway closures gave them no other option. There is a lesson here which even now (2006) politicians and British transport planners are yet to learn.

The closure program only slowed down when in 1968 Harold Wilson's government finally acted upon ideas similar to those of the private companies some 25 years earlier and created a framework for local transport authorities to offer financial support for socially necessary but financially unremunerative lines. Co-incidentally(?) this was just in time for another general election - which he lost. (Of course the ideas were re-packaged first so as make sure they looked different from the proposals of the private companies). However by this time much damage to the railway system had been done and although the wholesale closures had been stopped there were still more closures to come...

Among the last lines to close was a busy mainline linking Edinburgh and Carlisle which in 2000 became an urgent candidate for reopening and the 'Woodhead' line between Manchester & Sheffield which as recently as 1954 had benefited from very significant investment in both electrification and the building of a brand new tunnel under the Pennine Hills. (See below).

Whilst changing demographics would have justified some of the closures the real question is why the rail industry just 'sat back like lambs led to slaughter'? In just a handful of cases were attempts made to save branch lines by introducing new cheaper - to - operate diesel trains, yet judging by the very successful results it seems that had this become policy a lot more lines would have survived.

Perhaps the reasons why so little was done to try to save more branch (and main) lines include:
a) an unwillingness on behalf of railway management (and their civil servant masters) to try out new ideas,
b) a perception that the railways were essentially unimportant,
c) that a government transport minister owned a major road-building company.
d) by not having any shareholders on the stock market or pro-rail user groups there was no behind the scenes lobbying to argue the case for investing in the new technologies that would have saved these lines, and
e) a paternalistic attitude of arrogance within the British psyche in that the authorities always know best / are always right which came from several centuries of global pre-eminence (Colonialism) and what amounted to an attitude of virtual contempt for the views (and needs) of people who were different by the great and the good.

Incidentally, in some cases the trains were replaced by motor buses, but so few people transferred to the buses that they too were withdrawn. As stated earlier instead most people found themselves resigned to having to learn to drive, and going by car. There is a lesson here which even now (2006) politicians and British transport planners are yet to learn. (see below for possible alternative solutions to closure).

Once closed, forever closed?

Once a line was closed the assets (trackbeds, etc) were often sold off, with the rapid building of housing (or commercial properties) over the former alignments even being quite deliberate and apparently often specified in the land sale contracts. This was done to stifle the possibility of the line being resurrected at a later date.

Could local community - run operations have been profitable?

In some instances proposals were published by local people to create small private / independent railway companies which would take over lines that had been scheduled for closure and run them under local management. However, whilst it seems that "officialdom" were happy to allow railway preservationists to run operations as leisure / tourist lines the possibility of business-minded people actually trying to meet "real" transport needs - and doing so in a financially profitable way - was so abhorrent that every possible attempt was taken to stifle such enterprises before birth.

There would be several reasons for this, including:-
If local people ran a "real railway" and made it work, then not only would other people, the media, etc., start asking why they could do it but BR couldn't(!) but also why it was closed in the first place!!
Since many of the people taking the decisions on which lines would close had careers of their own, which they wanted to survive the downsizing, so they had vested interests in both re-inforcing the belief that the source of the problems lay in the lines being closed - and in making sure that nobody else would ever be able to prove them wrong or incompetent by making the doomed lines run profitably!.
The railway unions realised that if the new enterprises introduced more productive working practices which required fewer staff then the potential for similar being wanted for the main national system would potentially threaten their own power bases \ positions within the trade union hierarchy, etc.

The last point begs the question that whether despite their fine rhetoric the unions were really more interested in the politics of power (their own!) than the true well-being of their members, their members' jobs, or the railway system? If so this could be seen to suggest that their ulterior motives were even more self-serving than the politicians, who at least were accountable to Parliament and could be voted out of office.

Financial sleight of hand?

Research for this section of this web page seems to have uncovered what could be described as financial sleight of hand, double - dealing, and even (perhaps unintended) potential corruption.

Already mentioned (above) are the facts that in the early 1960's there was a government minister for transport who also owned a road building company. It is left for readers to draw their own conclusions with respect to what decisions might have been taken in a less than wholly impartial manner - and what might have happened had the minister been someone who was not already involved in the road transport industry. Also already mentioned is the fact that the civil servants (etc) who decided which lines were to close had vested interests (ie: their own careers) in making sure that their decisions could never be proven mistaken.

However, it also seems that some of the decisions were taken using data / statistics which had been biassed (or even stage-managed) to give the desired information. For instance:-

Especially on branch lines where there was a lot of seasonal traffic which originated on busier lines, the crediting of fares to only the station of purchase meant that through journeys made using tickets bought elsewhere (ie: at people's point of origin) were not taken into account.
It seems that sometimes asset renewal dates were moved (brought forward) to just after the scheduled closure date, thereby making it seem that if the line stayed open there would be a massive financial liability / the line would make a big loss.
The financial calculations did not take into account any costs that would remain even if the line closed (e.g. upkeep of overbridges)
With a few exceptions, minimal, (if any) attempts were made to bring down running costs - such as by using single carriage diesel trains / railcars instead of locomotive plus several passenger carriages on quiet services, or at quieter times running branch lines on the "one train only" basis, which would have been cheaper as there would not have been any need for (a) signalman (signalmen).

The Sham of the Public Consultations.

Although the public believed that they were being consulted on the proposed closures it seems that the public inquiries which often formed the consultation process were nothing more than mere "PR" exercises, or in other words, destined to be little more than Soviet / Nazi - style "show trials" where the decision (to rubber stamp government policy) was already a foregone conclusion.

Apparently the law actually assisted these nefarious "media circus publicity stunts" because under Transport Users Consultative Committee (TUCC) rules it was forbidden to cross-examine BR on its figures - so the public had no choice but to accept them as being 100% accurate, honest, truthful, etc. Anyone who did try to question the accuracy of the figures was told to sit down by the chairman, and if they refused to shut up they were ejected from the meeting. Admittedly similar rules applied to public enquiries for investment in (new) roads too, with it being forbidden to question the Ministry of Transport's figures justifying the need for the road improvements.

At least one TUCC chairman is reported to have boasted how quickly he could get the whole thing buttoned up and the line shut, as if he was working on a factory conveyor belt where speed was of the essence.

In addition to roads the Department Of Transport's responsibilities also includes the railways and several other transports; yet it uses a 'road' symbol for its logo. The slogan investing in roads could be continued disinvesting in the alternatives.

The Thatcher Years.

The rail closure / bustitution demon was resurrected under the Conservative government of 1979 (when Mrs Thatcher was in charge) but these plans were thwarted by electoral unpopularity and that many of the loss-making lines slated for closure were in parliamentary constituencies that formed the heartland of Conservative Party supporters. Nevertheless one mainline which her government allowed to be closed was the Manchester - Sheffield route via Woodhead which only a generation earlier had been electrified with a new mountain pass tunnel constructed too (see below).

Instead of closure Mrs Thatchers government instituted some business-led reforms which did, in some cases, turn the tide. For instance: the creation of 'Network SouthEast' and introduction of some 'customer focussed management' led to an unexpected reversal of the steady decline in passenger levels. Some of these business units were even profitable. This created a new dilemma, however - with passenger numbers increasing there was an even greater demand for investment to "grow the railway" and help it cope with the higher numbers of people travelling.

It is an unfortunate fact that until this surge in passenger traffic in the late 1980's the whole rail industry was run in a way which encouraged gradual decline, with it being policy for most routes to have only the absolute minimum in preventative maintenance as required for safety with the intention being that in time it would be cheaper to close the line completely.

As far as passenger services were concerned it was policy that as an alternative to having to make massive investments to cater for passenger growth the government would try to stifle demand by larger than necessary fares increases. Of course pricing people off the trains in this way resulted in more road traffic, air pollution, congestion - & motor fuel tax revenues. A co-incidence??

Mrs Thatchers' government prided itself in being vehemently pro-car / pro-road, equating private transport with 'freedom', people who use public transport as being 'failures', and totally failing to appreciate the concept of
freedom     to   choose   a   viable   alternative   to   having   to   drive.

Electric Locomotive 27000 'Electra'. One of six 1,500v dc electric locomotives built to an LNER design for express passenger services between Manchester and Sheffield via the brand new Woodhead tunnel which opened in 1954. When in 1969 passenger services were withdrawn from this line they were sold to Holland, where they provided sterling service until withdrawn in 1986. For freight traffic a fleet of 58 different locomotives were also built. Former British electric locomotive in Holland. When it opened in 1954 the Trans-Pennine Manchester - Sheffield overhead wire electric mainline electrification scheme was hailed as the most modern in Britain. Also serving Wath freight yard, the line was routed via the 'Woodhead' mountain pass where it used a brand new 3 miles 66 yards long rail tunnel which was specially built after WW2 for the electric services (Construction began in 1949, it opened in 1954). In 1969 it was decided to withdraw passenger services from this line, and concentrate on freight traffic, but in 1981 - just 27 years after the very expensive investment works had been completed - it was completely closed and dismantled. Officially the reasons given for the closure of this line included:- o   a fall in freight traffic so the other routes 'would be able to cope', o   the 'advanced' age of the engines, o   and that it was electrified to what had become a 'non standard' system which would have been too expensive to convert. (Note black text and blood red 'hollow' bullet points, specially chosen to match the reasons for closure). The line was electrified at 1,500v dc, as were several other lines in Britain which have now been converted to the present standard 25,000v ac. Also converted from 1,500v dc to 25,000v ac is the short western end of the route (as far as Hadfield / Glossup) that was kept open because it forms part of Manchester's local suburban electric rail system. Perhaps the real reason why this modern, electric railway was even listed for closure is that it formed part of the high-speed London (Marylebone) - Manchester mainline railway which was itself closed in the 1960's. The excuse about the engines being life expired cannot be serious as at the time many other engines and passenger trains were just as old, and there were no plans for their retirement. In 2001 a desire was announced to re-open this line because the existing Trans-Pennine road and rail routes can not cope with the amount of traffic trying to use them and it was felt that the Woodhead route would form the ideal basis for a high-speed line which would provide a much more attractive alternative to the congested M62 motorway. Of course it could be argued that the line should not have been closed in the first place...

Railway Privatisation

The ruling Conservative party believed that ideally most (if not all) of investment finance for the railways should be sourced from private industry, and not wholly from government / taxpayer's resources. They also saw some merit in dispensing with the "dead weight" of central planning by people who had little (or insufficient) concept of - or regard for - the needs of passengers often many tens or even hundreds of miles away from central London. This, they hoped would "free-up" the railways and open up railway operations to greater "on-rail" competition. In an attempt to provide a level playing field for competition (both "on-rail" s as well as against the roads) the government felt it desirable to (financially) separate the infrastructure from train operations

To achieve all this they included in the manifesto for the 1992 general election a proposal to return the state owned national railway system to private ownership. In pursuit of this, and immediately prior to the election some investment in the railways was announced. However whilst this timing was at least partly to be expected (pre-election 'bribes' such as this are not at all unusual) it was also done because there were very many old and worn out trains and government ministers felt that the system needed making attractive to future investors.

Privatisation began after the election. It was an exceptionally difficult and expensive process, carried out in the face of a very vocal and hostile percentage of the general population. It is assumed that there were also as many people who were in favour of privatisation, however these people were less vocal. During this process railway investment was halted with funds which might otherwise have been spent on the rail system being diverted to a multitude of very handsomely paid lawyers involved in the privatisation process. (Some people described them as over-paid 'fat-cat' lawyers) It may just be co-incidence but at the same time the lack of work forced some train building factories to close, with the inevitable loss of jobs. Being a very complex task privatisation took several years to accomplish, and in the end had to be hurriedly completed just before the following election - which the government lost.

After some internal debate the government decided that the best way to proceed would be by means of creating smaller more locally focussed Train Operating Companies (TOCs) which would be franchised out to any existing commercial organisations which wished to become involved. These would compete between themselves as well as against the buses, airlines and other road transports. Depending on the local specifics a TOC would either receive an annual subsidy or pay the government a premium for their right to operate the franchise, and to prevent arbitrary complete withdrawal of services the franchise agreements included a very basic minimum level of service frequencies (for which financial support would be provided). However, apart from availability of track space (and suitable rolling stock) there was nothing to stop a TOC from running more frequent trains, if it so desire(d)(s), on a solely commercial basis. The government also allowed for "open access" operators who would operate new services on a solely commercial basis, subject to availability of suitable trains, track space, and the agreement of a regulator. Railfreight operations were arranged differently so that all operators operated on the "open access" basis, for which they were given rights to run trains virtually nationwide, subject to pathing / timetabling agreements.

However the government soon found that the various commercial organisations which it had hoped would want to become involved and take on a TOC franchise (or two) saw the possibility of on-track competition based on cheapest fares similar to that which exists in the bus industry (outside of London) as being commercially unattractive, so to sweeten the pill and act as enticements the government rigged the system to limit such competition. This gave the TOC's the commercial freedom to raise fares - in some cases very significantly.

The rolling stock was sold to Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCO's) who lease the trains to the TOC's. The tracks and much of the physical infrastructure was vested in an impartial track authority (named Railtrack) which set the timetables, charged the TOCs for using the tracks, and (was supposed to) manage, look after & even expand the system to meet future needs. Everything was underpin by government money - which started to flow much more freely now that it was being used to look after commercial concerns with legally binding contracts, and not just "consumed" as investment in the physical things which define a railway system, such as new trains, stations, tracks, etc.

Once the order became settled the many train operators started making some investments designed to encourage more people to travel by train but unfortunately the company which controlled the infrastructure was less than successful (although it paid out good dividends to shareholders) and instead of making the hoped-for improvements in track capacity and reopening closed lines a bad situation became even worse culminating in several serious accidents which it is alleged were due to both fiscally-minded insufficient maintenance and poor maintenance. In the end that company was taken over as a government-owned not-for-profit company. However this organisation too is failing to "grow the railway" (re-opening closed lines, etc) claiming that costs are too high and that the expense of repairing infrastructure which has been allowed to decay whilst under the stewardship of the previous private owners (& the former state owners before them) and upgrading the West Coast Main Line for tilting trains has seen it being financially crippled. There is a problem in that since privatisation the basic cost of the day-to-day operations of the railway has sky-rocketed, as have costs involved in investing in new infrastructure. (see below)

Railway Privatisation 10 years on.

Privatisation saw the railway system become heavily fragmented, with most of the individual companies having their own cost centres, board of directors and shareholders earning dividends etc. Effectively this significantly increased operating costs - but not revenues - with the taxpayer having to "pick up the tab".

For various reasons, including streamlining train operations at busy London termini served by multiple TOCS and a desire to reduce the cost of operating the railway, as some franchises have come up for renewal there has been a process of redefining and amalgamation with the aim of reducing the 20+ TOC's in number. However it remains impossible to return the railways back to anywhere near the (inflation adjusted) operating costs as existed before privatisation.

Although overall passenger numbers have increased quite significantly (see below) track mileage has remained virtually stagnant; indeed if the reopenings (& electrification schemes) which the former British Railways was considering were to be taken in account then it could be said that the railways are still in retrenchment.

The situation has become slightly different for Scotland and Wales, as their national Parliaments now have transport in their portfolios, and as a result they have been more pro-active and a little more successful in growing the railway networks within their respective nations.

However, to say that railway privatisation has been "all bad" would be both wrong and inaccurate. As with everything in life there have been some winners as well as losers. There are some routes where competition has been very fierce, and at least partly based on price, (eg: London - Birmingham, although "TPTB" curtailed one of the three services, in the process reducing its attractiveness) whilst (for instance) in the Manchester area the mainline suburban services have not been as successful as well as many people would have liked or expected for a major city.

With an increase of about 50% since privatisation freight train operations could be said to have been more successful than passenger services operators - although the railways still carry just 11% of total UK freight. So even with Britain rapidly becoming a post industrialised nation there is scope for more growth in railfreight.

Railway Privatisation success stories
1. The Financial Industry - Stock Market, Banks, etc...

Perhaps the biggest single winners from privatisation are the financial organisations (banks, etc) which own the ROSCO's, and therefore own all the trains, which they lease out to the TOC's at such eye-watering rates that it sometimes seems to be financially unattractive for train operators to run longer trains at seasonally busy times. An often quoted example of how much money they are raking in is that of the 2 carriage class 158 diesel trains which cost the former state-owned British Railways £1 million to purchase - and the ROSCO's lease out at £½ million pa. Steep leasing charges such as this are often blamed for increasing costs so significantly (especially on more marginal routes) that short trains and overcrowding are commonplace... for some routes this issue can even lead to suggestions of complete closure....

Since much of the money paid by the TOC's to the ROSCO's comes from the government, so effectively it is tax payers money. To the casual observer it must seem that the lack of growth in the railway system mileage and new electrification is because so much money is involved in this financial merry-go-round where the tax payer is forever paying out & the ROSCO's raking in that there is not enough left for actually "growing the railway".

It is understood that the banks claim that their charges include maintenance and other unspecified costs, however the figures, as they stand, still give the impression of financial organisations 'raking it in'. The Stock Market, of course is also benefitting from the massive profits being made by many global fossil fuel and pharmaceutical organisations - and not just from the banks.

Railway Privatisation success stories
2.   Chiltern railway services out of London Marylebone Station

Under Network SouthEast (ie: the state owned British Railways) the "Chiltern Line" which runs trains out of London's Marylebone Station received significant investment, including significant modernisation, with there being new trains and the first present-era use of "Automatic Protection Signalling". In this way it became a model for what it was intended to do to many other routes in South East England (and eventually was partially achieved - albeit only after privatisation.)

Since privatisation, and with management who are now solely focussed on that line - instead of seeing it as a small cog in a much larger wheel - the routes' fortunes have gone from strength to strength with services on the High Wycombe branch expanded to serve new destinations too.

Railway Privatisation success stories
3.   Hull Trains services between London and Kingston-Upon-Hull.

The people of the east coast city of Kingston Upon Hull felt slighted because they no longer had through trains to London. So it was decided to try and "do something" about this and using "open access" rights operate such a service. In September 2000 Hull Trains was established, although so as not to provide too much competition with the principle East Coast Main Line (ECML) operator it is only allowed to serve a limited number of stations, most of which are beyond where the line to Hull diverges from the ECML. Being an open-access operator means that unlike a franchise there are no statutory minimum levels of service, and it is not entitled to a government subsidy.

In June 2002, the company was awarded 10-year access rights by the Rail Regulator. In making this decision the regulator said The Regulator does not believe that the primary impact of the additional service will be to abstract revenue from incumbent passenger train operators. (ie; other train service providers along the same route who could be looking to the regulator for financial support if too many passengers switched away from it). The Regulator believes that the additional service is likely to generate significant new patronage and revenue, particularly since recent high levels of growth in the rail market between Hull and London suggest that this market is far from saturated. It will offer benefits to both existing and new passengers through increased frequencies of direct services between Hull, Brough, Selby and London. Passengers at Howden will also benefit from through journey opportunities to London for the first time.

Passenger numbers increase...

By 2003 passenger numbers had soared by 33% compared to 1995 and the trains were carrying one billion passengers. In 2004 passenger numbers increased by one million journeys per week so that by the end of the year overall rail patronage had risen to one billion 500 million journeys, this being the highest number of passenger journeys since 1959 - when the network was almost twice the current size. By 2006 the number of passengers had soared to 1.15billion - up by 6.7% on the previous year and the highest in 60 years, by 2012 the figure had reached 1.46 billion passenger journeys, and were rising at about 7.8% per year. How many more journeys would there have been if the option of travelling by train had still been a viable alternative choice?

If judged by this growth of passenger numbers than it could be said that railway privatisation has been a phenomenal success.

To a certain extent some of this growth will be because with the partial relaxation of the previously very restrictive government financial restrictions many of the now locally focussed TOC's were able to afford to introduce new trains, and that most of them at least tried to increase passenger numbers ('grow the railway') by operating more frequent services too.

Unfortunately in some cases they almost tried too hard, resulting in some services becoming overcrowded, plus, on some routes, a situation whereby the sheer number of trains trying to use railway infrastructure which was insufficient in capacity (typically because of too few tracks, too few station platforms or inadequate signaling) resulting in on-track congestion which to resolve saw backward facing solutions being utilised - such as a curtailing of formerly proposed expansion and / or some services being reduced in frequency / downgraded in other ways.

At least in part these problems were caused by previous over zealous line closures and "rationalisations" - aka: simplifying / reducing track layouts and introducing signalling systems in ways which also reduced the total number of trains which could travel over them.

Another legacy from state controlled days which seriously curtailed growth in rail services that privatisation (at least temporarily) ended was the policy of "over the top" fare rises designed to limit growth and reduce the need for investment in railway infrastructure. However with some of the latest franchises requiring very large premium payments for the right to operate the franchise so this demon is returning, along with a penny pinching policy of running shorter trains (on routes away from the major London commuter flows), albeit with revenue generation - to pay the premium - being the aim.

Unfulfilled potential...

So history has shown that despite all the interference by the government, hostile indifference by the civil servants (especially the treasury lizards who only want to know how cheaply something could be done, not how well or whether by going for a cheaper scheme now it will result in further future investments ending up costing more than would otherwise have been the situation), the generations of sporadic & grudging under-investment plus the blatant disinvestment the railways are still essential and popular modes of transport. The rise of both the aviation and motor industries may have partially eroded the rôle of the railways but without the fully functioning nationwide railway network these other modes would be so overwhelmed that they would either seize up or to cope with demand would need far greater investments than the railways themselves received. That there still exists a massive pent-up demand for rail travel is undeniable - - all that is now needed is a new spirit of pro-active enhancements designed to allow the railways to comfortably carry all these willing customers / passengers and therefore truly provide a truly viable & affordable alternative choice to going by either car or airplane...

Autumn 2004, Yet another restructure of the railways...
The emergence of Community Railways.

In November 2004 the government announced plans to restructure railway operations (yet again)....
included in this reorganisation were proposals to...
abolish the Strategic Railway Authority which had only been created four years previously, and transfer its strategic planning to civil servants - even though their historic "track record" suggests that they will be more interested in "contracting" than "growing" the railway... especially as this reorganisation also...

left out the requirement (as contained in previous railway legislation) to promote railway transport...
diluted some PTE (ie: locally accountable Passenger Transport Executive) powers in respect of rail franchises...
abolished regional passenger councils...

and most ominously...
simplified the closure process to make it much easier to close any rail line regardless of the impact on the local communities they serve.

Also included in the re-structuring was a proposal to significantly reduce financial subsidies for 56 socially necessary but uneconomic rural lines. This is to be achieved by:-
Designating them as "Community Railways" and placing them under local community management,
Seeing if they can be operated "more cheaply".
By attracting local government and local business interests to invest and generally become actively involved in the line, its management, its future, and in attracting increased passenger numbers.

Apparently these 56 routes represent about 1,200 miles of railway with about 390 stations. They absorb approximately 12% of the total "subsidy" given to the railways but only represent 2% of passenger traffic.

The coming of the Community Railway has pleased some British transport campaigners and experts who cite the situation in Germany where it has been found that when quieter lines running just a handful of trains each day were put under local authority ownership their operation and management was totally transformed. In the first instance and by way of an experiment (to prove that the model can be viable in Britain) a handful of British lines are to be operated as community railways.

One possible problem which might be faced here in Britain is that whilst in Germany it is usual to plan rail and bus operations together - so that they dovetail with each other for the benefit of the travelling public - here in Britain it is more usual for buses and trains to compete against each other - often to the disbenefit of the travelling public. So it is *very* important that any British attempts at transport integration, joint timetabling, multi-modal AND multi-operator through ticketing etc., are NOT stifled (thwarted, killed off, etc) by the pen-pushers at the "Office of (un)Fair Trading" as being a "cartel working against the best interest of consumers" (this being the excuse they usually use by way of explanation for their decisions).

It is also *very* important that nothing is done which negatively impacts on any freight services which also use the lines - plus there must be a careful watch on the finances to make sure that the national treasury does not use local accountability as a back-door way of switching any financial burden onto already over-burdened local council-tax payers. (ie: dumping this onto people who it knows cannot afford increased financial responsibilities so that the lines will wither - even more - from lack of funding).

The images below show examples from overseas systems in order to demonstrate some of the solutions which could also be adopted here in Britain too.

Lighterweight trains such as these are used by train operating companies on contracted-out services mainline railways on suburban and regional workings in Norway, Germany, Austria, Canada, Switzerland, etc. Designed for regional and suburban services they provide the modern ambiance which passengers expect nowadays and a host of other features including...
wide doors and a lower floor that (depending on location) often provides platform-level access,
multi-purpose areas with tip-up longitudinal seating as this makes space for "personal wheeled transports" ie: pushchairs, bicycles, etc,
a fully walk-through design (within the train)
air conditioning,
a choice of electric, diesel-electric, diesel-mechanical or even dual transmission systems depending on local operator requirements,
a contrast to some British trains of incomparable magnitude - - eg: "Pacer" railbuses - which are more akin to ancient stagecoaches than transports fit for the 21st century..

In Germany local accountability and a "can do" attitude has also seen both the introduction of new passenger services over little used freight lines and the replacement of some life-expired local mainline trains with street-compatible lighterweight trains / railcars / trams. One of the first cities in the modern era to implement this solution was Karlsruhe in Germany. The Track & Route Sharing page looks at some of the history behind what in the transport industry has become known as the Karlsruhe Model. This page also explores other examples of track sharing, including some British examples which are not shown here.

In Kassel Germany two under-used freight lines in different parts of the city have seen the introduction of very successful passenger services as extensions to the existing tram system. Britain has many rail routes which are within urban areas and their close hinterlands that are only served by freight trains - some once carried passenger services as well and perhaps experience in Kassel points to a way in which passenger services could be restored to these lines too...

In early 2006 new services are scheduled to commence using two fleets of light rail vehicles (marketed under the banner of RegioTram) which will follow the Karlsruhe model and see through services between mainline railways and street tramway. However, whilst some of the new tramcars will be dual voltage (600v dc for street tramway and 15,000v ac for when on the mainline railway) there will also be some vehicles which feature on-board diesel engines so that they can be used on a mainline railway route which is not being electrified.

In Nordhausen, Germany, the tramway system includes some diesel-electric tramcars which provide through services linking the city streets (where they are powered from their overhead wires) with the semi-rural HSB's (Harz Narrow-Gauge Railway - Harzer Schmalspurbahn) tracks to Ilfeld where they supplement services already provided by the HSB's diesel trains.

This railway also operates freight and leisure-orientated steam services - in a British context this operating of services aimed at tourists - as well as local people - is an already proven successful way in which the leisure industry can generate income which both benefits the local economy and helps to keep the transport system financially viable. eg: Rhomney Dymchurch and Hythe Railway in Kent; the many leisure orientated services which are run in scenic areas of Britain - especially mid Wales, Scottish Highlands, Settle - Carlisle, etc

In Zwickau, Germany the same issues apply as with Karlsruhe (main railway station a short distance from the town centre) but they have adopted what could be described as the opposite solution.

The Zwickau Model sees lightweight diesel TrainTrams (also known as RegioSprinter in the railway / railroad industry) being extended from the mainline railway through urban streets just like a regular tram (streetcar) - albeit although they are used within the street environment and even (for a short distance) over part of a pedestrianised zone they are always segregated from the normal road traffic.

These TrainTrams are operated by the VogtlandBahn railway which is a regional train operating company which runs its trains over existing mainline railway tracks - and, in Zwickau, over part of the pre-existing street tramway. Because the trams are metre gauge and the trains are standard gauge so where the trams and trains share tracks they use a three rail system featuring one shared rail and one exclusive rail each.

Proven solutions which we have even started using here in Britain too...

The concept of putting mainline railway lines under local management (all assets, including tracks, etc) is already well-proven here in Britain. Railway routes involved include the eastern part of London Underground's Central Line, the High Barnet branch of the Northern Line and much of the Tyne & Wear Metro. For many years these routes continued to carry freight trains too. In the modern context there might be issues with the loss of the "network" effect, especially things such as loss of through ticketing and a new inability to use national railcards (senior citizens railcard, etc) which could lead to significant fare increases for some people. These are issues which would need taking into account, although simply discontinuing the train service per se would be a worse alternative option.

In the British context the conversion of two suburban railway lines in Manchester to light rail, plus more recent experiences with secondary routes in south London, hints at what can be achieved on urban rail lines which are not reaching their full potential. Although it is true that these routes are now dedicated to their new owners alternative routes are available for mainline rail services.

For routes where electrification is less likely to happen then bio-diesel powered (light) rail vehicles could provide a viable and very affordable alternative option, especially if it results in not having to pay the very steep rental costs the railco's must pay for hiring mainline trains (this ultimately being taxpayers money which goes straight into the pockets of the banks) and also results in lower track access charges, this being yet another new financial burden which did not exist before railway privatisation.

Another option for local branch lines are "lightweight rail" vehicles such as the Parry People Mover, providing a viable and very affordable alternative option.

Following trials on the Stourbridge branch in the West Midlands, June 2007 saw the granting of a train operating company franchise which specified the use of lightweight PPM railcars to operate on the short branch line between Stourbridge Junction and Stourbridge Town. Two new PPM 60 railcars were specially constructed for this service, with the aim of replacing the single carriage 'heavy' rail diesel trains which at the time were used on this route.

The lightweight rail service was planned for introduction before the end of 2008, in the event however it was in June 2009 when they eventually took over branchline duties.

Within months of their introduction in to full scale public service they proved the concept as being both viable and cost effective, with significant savings in liquid fuel use. Passengers also appreciate the more frequent service, which with a lightweight train every 10 minutes is now regarded as being a turn up and go service.

In March 2005 a damning report by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee slammed the government for choosing a method of the partial-privatisation of the London Underground which represented poor value for money - costing upwards of £1 billion of taxpayer's money just to set up & finance - when there were far cheaper alternative options that could have been used.

It is a criminal indictment that under present-day Governments financial criteria for railway investment the London Underground Victoria Line would not have been built because it would be seen as "uneconomic".

A 1967 Tube Stock Victoria Line train arrives at Kings Cross Station, London.